The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War

Very interesting read. Big fan of this

A great book revealing the grand plan strategy of Japan for defending herself and her colonies. Great military and diplomatic details. Really enjoyed the wars presented and the complexity of the second sino japanese war must buy

Klasse auf den Punkt gebracht in gut verständlichem, elegantem Englisch. Die Korephäe auf dem Gebiet.

Excelente livro explicando a época da restauração Meiji e seus impactos na sociedade japonesa. Também explica os motivos que levaram o império do sucesso inicial para seu eclipse sangrento na segunda guerra mundial. Da uma visão geral sobre os motivos que levaram o Japão a entrar na segunda guerra

Authoratative and well written in a clear and informative style.

Sarah C. M. Paine, docente allo United States Naval College, offre in The Japanese Empire un affresco a volo d'uccello della storia politico-militare giapponese dalle cause della rivoluzione Meiji alla disfatta nell'estate 1945. L'autrice si concentra molto sulla guerra sino-giapponese (1894-95) e sul conflitto contro la Russia zarista (1904-05), che individua come pivotali nella strutturazione di una strategia nazionale che, tuttavia, soffre della divisione tra una visione "continentale" difesa dall'esercito e di una postura più "marittima" propugnata dalla marina imperiale. Paine sostiene che Tokyo non seppe decidersi su quale delle due prediligere, imboccando prima l'una e poi l'altra con il risultato di combattere guerre sovradimensionate rispetto le sue reali possibilità. Si tratta del caso della seconda guerra sino-giapponese (1937-45), il cui lungo incubare è del pari trattato, ma più sinteticamente rispetto a quanto fatto nei capitoli precedenti. Allo stesso modo, le ostilità contro le potenze occidentali sono esposte in un'agile riassunto. Di valore, a mio avviso, è l'apertura di cui gode quest'opera: l'autrice riporta operazioni militari, crimini di guerra, motivazioni economiche, ragioni politiche, azioni unilaterali delle forze armate; presenta brevemente anche alcune personalità cruciali nella storia imperiale nipponica; fornisce cifre su differenti voci (forze in campo, perdite, spese militari, indici di produzione e così via). Di buona qualità le mappe, inserite tra un capitolo e l'altro. Di sicuro è un libro eccellente per avvicinarsi, pur senza dettagliati approfondimenti, all'Impero giapponese pre-1945, stante anche il registro linguistico non criptico.

This is an astounding slim volume with a surprising amount of detail. The central question asked is, what was the central strategic policy of Japan. How did it change over time and what were the influencing factors. Paine answers the questions of why and how Japan became destabiliser to the international regime. This happened in spite of the fact that Japan has a lot going for it as a naval power who could have defended her interests with a sea-based strategy incorporating open seas, free trade and investment in Asia, with almost no emphasis on building a large land-based Army. Essentially the policy of a Britain of the East. Such a decisive naval strategy had delivered results in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japan war. As the old-regime of the Genro died however the inability to make compromise, consistent armed victory, and hyper-Shinto-ism led to military controlling most of the levers in politics with direct access to the Emperor, bypassing the elective representatives. Political assassination reinforced political compliance to the military and the weak institutions guaranteed the influence of the military on Strategic policy. Weak institutions in the past could cobble together deals between the Genro founders of modern Japan who rivaled each other, but who possessed an international outlook, valued economic development, and compromise. Once they were gone they weak institutions they created crystalised mindsets. As Paine says "the Genro built the institutions. they were not the creatures of the institutions." Once they were largely gone the weak institutions of government ceased to become goalposts to maneuvre around and cut deals within. They then became the determinants of governance. When combined with Hyper-shinto-ism mentality governance ceased to be flexible if it did not conform to nationalist perspectives. Indeed those who went against the system were intimidated and often killed. With these developments it was a small step to the Kwantung Army being able to influence policy to set up Japan on a policy of continental dominance against Russia, then China and the US. This turn to continental policy fated Japan and doomed her at the same time, since according to Paine it was not necessary for Japan to guarantee both territorial integrity and economic success. It is a cautionary tale and one to keep in mind as another challenger to continental stability in Asia rears its head.