The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914

Was World War I inevitable? This splendid and readable book argues that it was not, focussing a series of specific policy choices made by individual national leaders in several different countries. Taken together, these choices unleashed the maelstrom, but Clark suggests that different choices could have been made, and that a different and more peaceful outcome might have followed. This brings us up against two key themes -- or more accurately points of disagreement -- in World War 1 historiography. First, there's what another reviewer succinctly describes as the powder keg vs. the match. The "powder keg" view argues that political and economic tensions in Europe in 1914 were so intense that war was inevitable, making the Sarajevo assassination and subsequent events nothing more than a trigger: had they not happened, something else would have done. The "match" view argues that a general European war was not inevitable, which makes Sarejevo very important indeed. Clark argues that the match mattered a great deal, more by detailing what actually did happen than by presenting counter-factuals. For me, this was a compelling approach. His detailed presentation of the Balkan situation and of Serbian internal politics is particularly enlightening, suggesting that Austria's response was not as irrational as is often assumed. And his discussion of the domestic pressures working on various political leaders taught me a great deal that I did not know. As well as specific issues -- he argues that much of the British military establishment saw a European war as something that could stop Home Rule in Ireland -- he discusses the cultural and even personal pressures that worked on key actors. Overall, he describes a policy environment in which internal communications were poor and lines of command blurred -- an environment in which mistakes were all too possible. Second, there is question of national war guilt, which has been a central issue ever since the Treaty of Versailles put all of the guilt on Germany. This was of course a major political issue in the interwar period, which tended to be pushed aside after World War II. But Fritz Fischer reopened the argument with a bang in 1961; in "Germany's Aims in the First World War", Fischer argued that Germany planned the war as a step towards European domination, making Hitler's policies a continuation rather than an aberration. The debate that Fischer opened up is still wide open. Some who disagree with him argue that another country (Russia, or France, or England) bore at least a large part of the responsibility, while others argue that war was triggered by a series of mistakes that left all participants (or no participants) responsible. All involved have tended to move towards more nuanced points of view, but big differences persist. Clark's title makes it clear where he stands in this debate: "Sleepwalkers" argues that the war resulted from mistakes rather than intention, though several national leaders were only too ready to move towards the brink. The institutional issues are critical here, in that leaders did not have accurate information, and did not communicate clearly, on a national as well as an international level. Moreover, he describes a situation in which all the major players had belief systems -- different and contradictory belief systems -- which allowed them to convince themselves that highly aggressive actions were in fact defensive. Overall, this is an illuminating and very interesting book. Any historian of course selects and arranges his evidence, and Clark does so quite brilliantly. I am not entirely convinced that the war could in fact have been avoided. But reading this book has certainly shown me how much individual misjudgements and random chance had to do with the war's outbreak,and how much Sarajevo really did matter.

This is a masterpiece.It is the clearest and best documented account in one volume of why and how the 1st WW happened,not by the Sarajevo assassination but by events going back many years. Reading this very well written book one understands the strength of the possible when it becomes probable until,"Some stupid thing in the Balkans"happens, as Bismarck had foreseen thirty years previously. The book combines deep and broad research,diligent and profound analysis and intelligent and rational synthesis of a tremendous amount of data.It also provides a rationale (to the extent that a rationale exists)for the acts of the various players of that period up to the start of the War.Every nation's and every caste's within the nations are examined exposed and understood better than before. The shaping of intentions and the shaping of actions by intentions ,all originating in perceptions is clearly demonstrated ,analysed and exposed for our judgement The best way I can describe this book is that it shows how the various political,diplomatic and military clouds formed, how these clouds interacted within a nation,between two nations,and in the whole of Europe and the results of these interactions. It shows how every year from about 1905 to 1914 ,brought the conflict closer and the probability of a war increasing as time went by. Reading the book is like watching a collision in slow motion.The irreconciiability of perceived interests of every nation with opposing nations led to the formation of the two alliances.Professor Clark demonstrates also that Great Britain was not the undecided bystander in this conflict as often presented,but there also a Team of Players in power ,with or without parliamentary legitimization in a convoluted way,contributed to the build-up of the momentum that led to the collision. The principal conclusion of the book is that there ware no innocent parties except Belgium,and each,unable to act for Peace,dominated by fear ,perceived potential danger,and greed and forced to a confrontational rectitude by the stiffness of their male egos,accepted by steps the fatality of war. The book is significant not only for its Academic Honesty and Intellectual Integrity but also for the depth of its perception of causes an effects even the very minor ones,and the presentation of them all for the reader to be the final judge. The first part of the book is the most interesting part ,also because the second part is much more written about and known.The author elegantly avoids to assign responsibilities in a more even handed than necessary and somewhat insipid way,hence my 4 1/2 stars instead of 5. The writing by a gifted storyteller is in an elegantly simple and free of conceit prose,arranging the real events in such a way as to create the interest to the reader.It is a pleasure to read. D.V.Kokkinos PS It is the sarcasm of History that Serbia was grown to Yugoslavia after the 1st WW for the wrong reasons and was reduced again to small Serbia after 75 years again for the wrong reasons by the Great Powers of the times

Like many people, I had an uptick (well, more than that) interest in anything about WWI because the 100th anniversary of the commencement of hostilities in Europe. As an amateur hobbyist in European history, I felt like my knowledge about WWI was weak (and it is very weak). So I scanned Amazon's titles, looking for a book that covered the reasons why Europe went to war. There were bundles of books that discussed the strategies and tactics in the battles, but not as much covering the excruciating politics that lead to the War to End All Wars. I decided to purchase Clark's book, because it was well reviewed, but more than that, it's much more recent scholarship on the topic. Overall, I really loved the book. It is detailed, scholarly, and brings in characters about whom I knew little. But, for those of you who want to have a quick read, this book isn't it. For example, I would estimate that one-third of the book focuses on the Balkans, specifically on Serbia's guilt (or at least, co-conspirator) in the beginning of the war. I did get a little frustrated reading about the Balkans, when the real heart of the war was much further north and west. But everything I read about the planning and implementation of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, and what happened in Austria and Serbia after that. What was surprising was the almost nonchalant attitude of every character in the story to the event. Clark leads the reader through the excruciating decision, mistakes, misinformation and downright stupidity that lead Europe down the path of war. I counted at least 10 instances when everyone could have backed away easily, and who knows, maybe WWI (though WWII probably would have anyways). I was also surprised by the involvement of Europe's monarchies in the lead-up to war. The book starts with a regicide of the Serbian King by Army Officers (the very first step, at least in this narrative, to WWI), so all of the royal families of Europe were part of the story. In fact, I was surprised about the liberalism and wisdom exhibited by some of the leaders. The Czars, Emperors and Kings all had a part to play in the slow walk (cause they weren't running) to war. Again, I loved this book. Some minor nitpicks would be the long discussion of the Balkans (and I remain unconvinced that should be given such importance, but I am just an amateur); the lack of focus on the UK, which gave me the impression that they were either uninterested or playing chess pieces in the background; and occasional wandering off-topic to give us backstories. The title of the book is perfect. Europe more or less sleepwalked into WWI. The story is almost laughable, except that 40 million people died in the war. It's just appalling to realize that dysfunctional monarchies, incompetent and duplicitous foreign affair ministries, along with a dash of pride and arrogance lead to this war. I kept slapping my forehead when Clark would tell a story of how some official misinterpreted something or when an official hints that another course would be prudent, and everyone misses the hint. Of course, the world of early 20th century communications would have been a hindrance. If you have any interest in the causes of war, rather than the war itself, this book is for you. If you have a sudden interest in WWI history, this book is for you. It's not perfect. But it's pretty close. I loved it.

THE SLEEPWALKERS: How Europe went to war in 1914. Let me state it at the outset. "The Sleepwalkers" by Cristopher Clark is one of the best books ever written about the causes of World War 1. Mr. Clark begins with an informed and perceptive analysis of Balkan politics, and follows this with an equally cogent and lucid examination of European politics with special emphasis on the evolution of Anglo-German relations. Each of the nations of the Triple Entente is critiqued in turn. About Russia, Clark writes: "In taking these steps [Ministerial Councils of July 24 and 25], Sazonov and his colleagues escalated the crisis and greatly increased the likelihood of a general European war. For one thing, Russian pre-mobilization altered the political chemistry in Serbia, making it unthinkable that the Belgrade government, which had originally given serious consideration to accepting the ultimatum, would back down in the face of Austrian pressure. It also heightened the domestic pressure on the Russian administration, for the sight of uniformed men and the news that Russia would not `remain indifferent' to the fate of Serbia stirred euphoria in the nationalist press. It sounded alarm bells in Austria-Hungary. Most importantly of all, these measures drastically raised the pressure on Germany, which had so far abstained from military preparations and was still counting on the localization of the Austro-Serbian conflict. Why did Sazonov do it? He was not a candid man and never produced a reliable account of his actions or motivations during these days, but the most plausible and obvious answer lies in his very first reaction to the news of the ultimatum: `C'est la guerre Européenne!' Sazonov believed from the outset that an Austrian military action against Serbia must trigger a Russian counter-attack. His response to the ultimatum was entirely consistent with his earlier commitments. Sazonov had never acknowledged that Austria-Hungary had a right to counter-measures in the face of Serbian irredentism. On the contrary, he had endorsed the politics of Balkan irredentism and had explicitly aligned himself with the view that Serbia was the rightful successor to the lands of unredeemed South Slavdom within the dual monarchy, an obsolete multi-ethnic structure whose days , in his view, were in any case numbered. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the days of the autocratic, multi-ethnic Russian Empire, whose minority relations were in worse condition than Austria-Hungary's, might also be numbered. Sazonov had denied from the start Austria's right to take action of any kind against Belgrade after the assassinations. He had repeatedly indicated in a range of contexts that he would respond militarily to any action against the client state. Already on 18 July, shortly after it became known that an Austrian note of some sort was in preparation, Sazonov had told Sir George Buchanan that `anything resembling an Austrian ultimatum in Belgrade could not leave Russia indifferent, and she might be forced to take some precautionary military measures." Clark, Christopher (2013-03-19). The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (pp. 480-481). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition. And . . . "Was all this done on Serbia's behalf alone? Was Russia really willing to risk war in order to protect the integrity of its distant client? We have seen that Serbia's importance in Russian eyes grew during the last years before the war, partly because of the deepening alienation from Sofia and partly because Serbia was a better instrument than Bulgaria for applying pressure to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Sympathy with the Serbian cause was strong in Russian pan-Slavist and nationalist circles - this was an issue with which the government could build useful bridges to its middle-class public. On the other hand, St Petersburg had been willing to leave Belgrade to its own devices in October 1913, when the Austrians had issued an ultimatum demanding their withdrawal from northern Albania . And unlike Russia's neighbour Bulgaria, which possessed a piece of Black Sea coast, Serbia could hardly be seen as geopolitically crucial to Russian security." Clark, Christopher (2013-03-19). The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (p. 484). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition. And . . . "On the other hand, the Straits issue doubtless carried considerable weight for Krivoshein, whose responsibility for agricultural exports made him especially aware of the vulnerability of Russian commercial shipping. Recent instability in the Balkans had tended to fuse the Balkan theatre with the Straits question, so that the peninsula came increasingly to be seen as the crucial strategic hinterland to the Straits. Russian control of the Balkans would place St Petersburg in a far better position to prevent unwanted intrusions on the Bosphorus. Designs on the Straits were thus an important reinforcing factor in the decision to stand firm over the threat to Serbia. Whatever the precise order of geopolitical priorities, the Russians were already on the road to war. At this point, the horizons of possibility began to narrow. It becomes in retrospect harder (though not impossible) to imagine alternatives to the war that actually did break out in the first days of August 1914. This is doubtless what General Dobrorolsky, head of the Russian army's mobilization department, meant when he remarked in 1921 that after the St Petersburg meetings of 24 and 25 July `the war was already a decided thing, and all the flood of telegrams between the governments of Russia and Germany were nothing but the staging for an historical drama'. And yet throughout the crucial days of the fourth week of July, the Russians and their French partners continued to speak of a policy of peace. The policy of `firmness', as expounded by Poincaré, Sazonov, Paléologue, Izvolsky, Krivoshein and their colleagues was a policy that aimed, in the words of the Tsar , `to safeguard peace by the demonstration of force'." Clark, Christopher (2013-03-19). The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (p. 480). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition. Clark notes the following about Sir Edward Grey: "Britain presents a rather different picture. Unlike Stolypin and Kokovtsov or their German colleagues Bülow and Bethmann Hollweg, the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had no reason to fear unwanted interventions by the sovereign . George V was perfectly happy to be led by his foreign secretary in international matters. And Grey also enjoyed the unstinting support of his prime minister, Herbert Asquith. Nor did he have to contend, as his French colleagues did, with over-mighty functionaries in his own Foreign Office. Grey's continuity in office alone assured him a more consistent influence over policy than most of his French colleagues ever enjoyed. While Edward Grey remained in control of the Foreign Office for the years between December 1905 and December 1916, the same period in France saw fifteen ministers of foreign affairs come and go. Moreover, Grey's arrival at the Foreign Office consolidated the influence of a network of senior officials who broadly shared his view of British foreign policy. Grey was without doubt the most powerful foreign minister of pre-war Europe." Clark, Christopher (2013-03-19). The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (p. 200). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition. Clark seems to endorse the legion of post-War French critics who accused Poincare of fomenting a European war in order to conquer Alsace/Lorraine, but there is a curious disconnect between these observations and his final "Conclusion," in which he adheres to a determined neutrality: "Where does this leave the question of culpability? By asserting that Germany and her allies were morally responsible for the outbreak of war, Article 231 of the Versailles Peace Treaty ensured that questions of culpability would remain at or near the centre of the debate over the war's origins. The blame game has never lost its appeal. The most influential articulation of this tradition is the `Fischer thesis' - shorthand for a bundle of arguments elaborated in the 1960s by Fritz Fischer, Imanuel Geiss and a score of younger German colleagues, who identified Germany as the power chiefly culpable in the outbreak of war. According to this view (leaving aside the many variations within the Fischer school), the Germans did not stumble or slither into war. They chose it - worse, they planned it in advance, in the hope of breaking out of their European isolation and launching a bid for world power. Recent studies of the resulting Fischer controversy have highlighted the links between this debate and the fraught process by which German intellectuals came to terms with the contaminating moral legacy of the Nazi era, and Fischer's arguments have been subjected to criticism on many points. Nonetheless, a diluted version of the Fischer thesis still dominates in studies of Germany's road to war. Do we really need to make the case against a single guilty state, or to rank the states according to their respective share in responsibility for the outbreak of war? In one classical study from the origins literature, Paul Kennedy remarked that it is `flaccid' to dodge the search for a culprit by blaming all or none of the belligerent states. A stiffer approach, Kennedy implies, ought not to shrink from pointing the finger. The problem with a blame-centered account is not that one may end up blaming the wrong party. It is rather that accounts structured around blame come with built -in assumptions. They tend, firstly, to presume that in conflictual interactions one protagonist must ultimately be right and the other wrong. Were the Serbs wrong to seek to unify Serbdom? Were the Austrians wrong to insist on the independence of Albania? Was one of these enterprises more wrong than the other? The question is meaningless. A further drawback of prosecutorial narratives is that they narrow the field of vision by focusing on the political temperament and initiatives of one particular state rather than on multilateral processes of interaction. Then there is the problem that the quest for blame predisposes the investigator to construe the actions of decision-makers as planned and driven by a coherent intention. You have to show that someone willed war as well as caused it. In its extreme form, this mode of procedure produces conspiratorial narratives in which a coterie of powerful individuals, like velvet-jacketed Bond villains, controls events from behind the scene in accordance with a malevolent plan. There is no denying the moral satisfaction delivered by such narratives, and it is not, of course, logically impossible that war came about in this manner in the summer of 1914, but the view expounded in this book is that such arguments are not supported by the evidence. The outbreak of war in 1914 is not an Agatha Christie drama at the end of which we will discover the culprit standing over a corpse in the conservatory with a smoking pistol. There is no smoking gun in this story; or, rather, there is one in the hands of every major character. Viewed in this light, the outbreak of war was a tragedy, not a crime." This conclusion is disappointing, coming as it does after a number of Clark's earlier conclusions which do indeed point the finger of blame at the nations of the Triple Entente. The Great War came because some influential groups of leaders wanted it to come and used the opposing coalitions to bring it about, using the pretext of "some damned foolish thing in the Balkans . . ." (Bismarck) Both Russia [Isvolsky/Sasonov] and France [Poincare] were prepared to risk a European war to realize their respective objectives as long as they felt reasonably certain of victory. Great Britain [Grey]provided that certainty and Clark does not fail to make the point - except in his final "Conclusion." The Fischer thesis of war-guilt has been discredited by any number of historians including one of Clark's own contemporaries, Niall Ferguson. Christopher Clark has nevertheless written an impressive volume which deserves top billing on any list of `must read' books for serious students of WW1.

I look forward to taking on this book. That said, it sure would be appreciated greatly if publishers would put these books out with larger type and simply charge more. My review of the book is 4-5 stars, reduced to three owing to type size.

This is one of the best of the current crop of big-picture, "How and why did it start?" books about the Great War. Despite the title, this book does not endorse a "Sleepwalker" theory at all (except perhaps as regards Britain, and even there not so much). Very much to the contrary, he shows why war was a rational choice for Austria-Hungary, Russia, France and Germany. The choice only seems irrational when one knows the outcome for each of these countries' regimes. Far too much emphasis has been put either on theories of national character (essentially what the German war guilt school comes to) or the last-minute school (Moltke's train schedules, Nicholas' and Wilhelm's last-minute dithering). The good points of Clark's book are: broad temporal sweep, neither concentrating too much on the June/July 1914 period nor under-emphasizing it; the relative attention paid to Serbia, Russia and Austria-Hungary, while many accounts emphasize Germany and the UK; and a better use of sources than many other authors, who often treat self-serving or post-war writings or utterances by statesmen as probative of highly disputable facts and positions prior to the outbreak (very few historians have shown themselves immune to this very serious failing). Neither good nor bad, but no doubt disturbing to some, is Clark's "Teutonophilia" -- which I put in scare quotes because so many of us have been brought up on the Fischer thesis and, because of Hitler and WWII, find a German war guilt explanation for WWI easy to accept. Clark makes a subtle and low-volume case that the outbreak of war was much more the result (1) Serbian aggression, (2) Austro-Hungary's fatalism, (3) French policy to insure Russian involvement in a German war, and (4) Russian pan-slavism and over-confidence. By contrast, the decision-making and policies in Berlin and London were less important. I thought Clark was particularly good in doing what every good historian should, that is, explain to the reader the mindset that existed AT THE TIME; thus, because of the performance of the Tsarist army in the actual war, and the memory of the Russo-Japanese war 9 years earlier, we tend to miss what Clark emphasizes, which is that in 1914 the Russian government was highly confident of its armed forces. The attention often given to the British-German naval build-ups is, properly, downplayed here; the powers were probably more concerned about the timing of the build-up of the internal Russian railway system, rather than the timing of the opening of the Kiel canal. Finally, while I gave the book "5 stars", I should note that it is not particularly well-written. The prose is serviceable and not overly academic, but lacks the brilliance that some historians have brought to the subject. Clark makes up for this lack, though, in his fine judgments, unearthing of the contemporary mindset, and careful sifting of the contemporary evidence.

The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 Christopher Clark This is debatably as good a lesson in history as the writings of Barbara Tuchman. Most of us only know that World War I started after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, a few more know Ferdinand was from Austria and less know he was the heir apparent to the Austrian throne. I don’t mean that as an indictment on U.S. history education because the causes of the war had little to do with the United States but Clark shows how the European conduct of foreign affairs, the war itself, and the forces that cause the insane peace treaty influenced the world. “Sleepwalkers” is the perfect title because Europe was living in a pre-1800 mentality that caused them to be conservatively dormant for 100 years, relying on outmoded monarchies for reasons to ignore other nations and nationalities while hiding individuality behind the draperies of their God appointed thrones. Austria apparently believed it was a dominant world power, Germany was ignored because they were a new power, England saw no reason to get involved by assisting France until they saw that a German Army across the Channel and a German Navy in the small stretch of water could be a dominant threat and that a diverted French Navy opened the Mediterranean to Germany, Russia, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire. While I am only touching on the causes and mentality, Clark goes into depth in both a detailed and entertaining way. Clark also makes a detailed explanation of the assassination itself, which could be a standalone book. First, there was more than one assassin and more than one attempt on June 28, 1914. In fact the earlier attempts cause Ferdinand to change the rout so he could visit those wounded in a faltered bomb throwing incident. This slowed the caravan and put him in front of Gavrilo Princip who fired the fatal shots and was captured. Yes, captured. The fact is, as Clark points out, had Princip been killed there may not have been a war since Austria declared war, another interesting story, because they wanted their army to investigate the assassination thus destroying the sovereignty of Bosnia/Serbian people. This also points out why Princip remains a hero to this day. He, and the people he was with, were not psychotic terrorists but people rebelling against virtual oppression wanting their independence. I will warn you that reading this, especially as an American, takes research. That can easily be done on an e-reader that accesses the internet, or by staying close to a computer since many of the facts are unknown to us. In short it can take longer to read than the page count indicates, but it is well worth it. I highly recommend this work to both people interested in the WW I, the ensuing half century following the war, and anyone thinking of writing about history. It is very well laid out and refuses to leave important facts to the readers imagination. Clark dots the I’s and crosses the t’s.

This is an excellent read! Well researched, very logical, well written, cogent and convincing. As the author points out, tons of books have been written on this subject and I've read my share, starting as an undergrad back in the sixties. Of the ones I've read, this is the best of the lot. Most of the others just rehash the same tired ground. I've read "Iron Kingdom" by this author as well and that also is excellent. New insights, approaches(in no particular order and by no means comprehensive): Clark emphasizes the difference in approaching this subject by focusing on the "how" rather than the "why" things happened. The former zeroes in on proximate events whereas the latter tends to wander far afield and ends up in questions of culpability. "How" did Germany stray from Bismark's dictum to never alienate Russia. What was the nature of Britain's rapprochement with France and Russia and how did the UK end up at war with Germany. Both Russia and, to a lesser extent, France were much greater threats to Britain's empire than Germany and this accounted for Britain's appeasement of the former by joining the Entente. Paradoxically, Britain allied itself with the very powers that posed the greatest challenge to its empire. The so-called naval arms race with Germany was a non-issue because Britain won it hands down, no contest. What were the dynamics in the British Foreign Office, Liberal Party politics and the Irish Home Rule question that transformed England from a staunch neutral to a participant on the French and Russian side. Very interesting portrait of Sir Edward Grey, one of the most "baffling" personalities of the period. How did Russia, which had no issues with Germany to speak of, end up so closely tethered to France(short answer-money!)? What were the actual dynamics of the assassination in Sarajevo? What was the nature of the Serbian state? How involved was Serbia in the actual assassination? Was Austria justified in its response? What was the nature of Russia's pan-slavism? Did it, in fact, enjoy wide support? Was the Hapsburg empire, in fact, on its last legs as has been widely accepted(and was so accounted at the time) or was it an evolving, modern, effective, multi-ethnic polity which many of its former citizens mourned after its passing. Who exactly was Franz Ferdinand? An unpopular dilettante nonentity or, in fact, an energetic, intelligent, reforming wunderkind, the new best hope for the Hapsburgs and the peoples of central and southeast Europe. I could go on but then I'd simply be paraphrasing the book. Why do we still focus on this issue? Is it because WWI was, in fact, the "fundamental calamity of the twentieth century", the source of all the mayhem that followed and many of the issues that bedevil us today? "Why" did it happen? "It is all very mysterious," the historian John Keegan has written..."but then the First World War is a mystery. Its origins are mysterious. So is its course. Why did a prosperous continent, at the height of its success as a source and agent of global wealth and power and at one of the peaks of its intellectual and cultural achievement, choose to risk all that it had won for itself and all it offered to the world in the lottery of a vicious and local internecine conflict?" We need to keep asking these questions. We need to find answers On this topic, Christopher Clark has brought us a long way toward clarity.

The title, The Sleepwalkers, says it all. I have never understood WHY the great powers of Europe went to war in 1914 and after reading this, it is clear that they did not know either. This book is about HOW it happened, in a huge narrative on all the contributing players, from the tubercular assassin of Archduke Ferdinand to the ineffectual Tsar in Russia and the erratic Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, to struggling bureaucrats in the French and British Foreign Ministries. It is agonizingly fascinating and above all, as Clark keeps reminding the reader, it didn't have to turn out the way it did; the what-ifs are so numerous and so possible that the Great War might have been avoided. After all, even the major powers persisted right up to the end in thinking that the crisis could be resolved in weeks if not a few months. The grenade pin for all this seems to have been Serbia, a brutal backwater and recently established kingdom in the Balkans. As the Ottomans are beaten back, the impoverished societies that remained began to fight each other for territory, irredentist ambitions, and proto-fascist nationalism. Because Austria-Hungary was involved in Croatia, the Serbs became a proxy for Russia as it pursued an ill-defined pan-slavism and harassed its Habsburg rivals. How did Serbia become such a crucial player? With the exception of republican France, all the involved European powers were monarchies, ranging from a constitutional one in the UK, through the semi-autocracies in Austria-Hungary and Germany, to full blown despotism in Russia. In their evolving modalities, the foreign policy apparati were in chaotic states, with the sovereign in nominal control while bureaucrats and aristocrats fought for influence; in theory, the executives should issue official orders and at best, play the role of balancing all the competing interests, but none of them seemed up to that task. As a result, policy making was an opaque process in which aims, signals, and actions were impossible to discern clearly; this increased uncertainty and led the actors into decisions that further aggravated the dangers and uncertainties. Moreover, there was no neutral power or multi-lateral diplomatic body that could mediate, provide a space to openly discuss the situation, or de-escalate situations in which military courses of action had been initiated. It was like a massive Rube Goldberg machine with ten entry points, each player trying to balance complex equations of military stability, prestige, ego, societal and economic needs, and the like. One might also picture the situation as a teetering boulder atop a mountain with all manner of actors throwing rocks at it and at each other. Another unfortunate development was the diplomatic configuration that had emerged with secret protocols, vague promises, and volatile pronouncements. On the one hand, there was the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy), which pledged mutual defense. On the other hand, there was the looser Entente, whereby Britain, France, and Russia pledged to defend each other if attacked or in the event that any member of the Triple Alliance fully mobilized its military. The end result was extreme polarization, pitting central European powers against vast colonial Empires. Their principal playing field consisted of the territories opening up with the Turkish retreat and peripheral areas such as Serbia and Bulgaria (they were intermittently at war); the former was allied to Russia, the latter to Austria-Hungary. There were so many flash points, with multiple crises resolved, that it all seemed grist for the mill. The concerns of each country are examined in detail. Not only are there fascinating mini-biographies, but the geopolitical situations are explained and subtly interpreted. Beyond the obvious, such as Germany's fear of a war on two fronts, there are many surprises here. The cumbersome dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, for example, was by no means doomed in Clark's view, but an evolving and stabilizing force; even Archduke Ferdinand comes off as a man of great potential in spite of his unpopularity. Perhaps this kind of detail is of interest only for history buffs, but I learned an immense amount from these analyses. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo was the last straw, the pebble that loosed the boulder and sent it to smash everything. Austria-Hungary blamed Serbia and issued demands for an investigation and humiliating surrenders of sovereignty. Russia backed Serbia, emboldening it to resist, and began to mobilize its troops, triggering Germany to mobilize in support of Austria-Hungary. France of course supported Russia and, after some hemming and hawing, the UK committed itself to the defense of France, particularly if neutral Belgium was attacked by Germany. Although in the weeks between the assassination and war's outbreak, there were many opportunities where mobilizations were ordered halted so that talks could begin, once in motion the military machines appeared unstoppable. Kaiser Wilhelm even cut short his summer vacation to slow things down, but his orders were ignored or lost. The book ends on the eve of the war. This is one of the most satisfying reading experiences I have had in years. Clark is a great writer, finding the right biographical detail or quote to support a point, always with extremely human sensibilities and empathy. He questions many accepted conventions, which are sure to be controversial but highly stimulating. I cannot recommend this book more highly or more enthusiastically. If the book occasionally gets bogged down or lost in detail, it always returns to a powerful narrative, whose momentum builds over nearly 600 pages. This is a masterpiece.

Man kann streiten, ob Europa nur "schlafwandelnd" (sleep walking) in die Katastrophe des I. Weltkriegs gerutscht ist, oder ob nicht einige diesen Krieg unbedingt wollten, andere nur bedingt als frühe Prävention gegen ein militärisch stärker werdendes frz.-russ. Bündnis, so trägt auch Deutschland, wenngleich nur in dritter Reihe, Mitschuld an dem "Großen Krieg", der zur Entmachtung West- und Mitteleuropas und zum imperialen Mächtig- und Übermächtigwerden Russlands führte. An die Stelle der von Leibniz noch ins Auge gefassten Chinesisch-Europäischen allianz ist mittlerweile eine Chinesisch-Russische Prädominanz geworden, die v.a. im Ostpazifikraum für ein gewisses Brodeln sorgt. Von daher, aber auch mit Blick auf den "Mittleren Osten", sind heute 2014 die Chancen der Kriegsvermeidung um ein Vielfaches schlechter als1914. Jener Krieg war leicht vermeidbar, trotz des Drängens von Paris in St. Petersburg, gegenüber der Doppelmonarchie und seinen Verbündeten hart zu bleiben und einen Krieg nicht feige zu vermeiden. Hätte Frankreich das Resultat gekannt und mit Versailles seine Mitschuld an der Katastrophe des 20.Jhs., dann hätte es den Krieg nicht so unbefangen forciert (wie dann ja später auch von dt. Seite). Also: Schlafwandeln ist eine Seite, definitiv den Krieg als Mittel der Selbstdurchsetzung bejahen (wie heute noch Rußland und China, früher eben auch europäische Staaten) ist die andere. Gut ist auch, wie Clark die "Serbian Ghosts" beschreibt und so deutlich macht, dass der serbisch-russische (unheilbare und bis heute unbelehrbare) Nationalismus am Anfang dieses Kapitels der nationalistischen Selbstzerfleischung Europas stand. Heute ist man geneigt, den Mord von Sarajewo als kleine politische "Provokation" anzusehen, der gegenüber man besser "cool" reagiert hätte. Aber Clark rückt das sehr anschaulich in ein anderes Licht, sehr detailreich und kenntnisreich. Zu meiner Schulzeit (bin Jg. 55) dominierte im Geschichtsunterricht die These von Fritz Fischer: Deutschland ist primär schuld gewesen 1914, und später -1939- hat dann ein Österreicher namens A.H. den II. Weltkrieg "angezettelt". Clark behauptet wohl zurecht, dass uns die These Fischers auch heute noch "im Blut" ist: It still dominates unsere Betrachtung des Weges in den Krieg (p. 560). Manche sind regelrecht verliebt in die These der deutschen Schuld (so dass sie blind werden für die Konstellationen, die faktisch in Hass, Mord und Untergang führen) - wir sind eben ein gut protestantisch geprägtes Land, haben ein narzißtisches Verhältnis zu unserem (wirklichen oder imaginären) Schuldigsein. "The Sleepwalkers" ist ein differenziertes, gehaltreiches Buch. Das englische Original ist schwerer zu lesen (weil kleiner gedruckt), aber durchaus noch im "grünen Bereich" von der Letterngröße her.

An eye opener for a history buff like me. Maybe the trained Historians know all this but the facts and the characters brought out by this book is like amazing

Excelente libro! Muestra la enorme serie de factores, relacionados entre sí de manera compleja, que llevaron a la primera guerra mundial. No cae en la comodidad de ninguna hipótesis simple como culpar a una sola nación de la guerra.

The book-reading tribe to which I belong is allergic to detail, which makes it surprising that I found this history of how WWI started so deeply enjoyable. Professor Clark not only knows his stuff but he also exhibits profound scholarship. His research has reached almost impossible limits, with the result that for those with a hankering for history and a desire to eavesdrop on what was said, by whom, to whom, and where, will be fully rewarded for the effort of reading this page-turning account of how a small contingent of amateur assassins started a conflagration that killed millions. This is not another history of war … it is a thorough explanation of how one of the most bloody in history started. Highly recommended.